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Abstract 
In recent years, information warfare has become one of the top priorities on the 
international security agenda. The significant rise of the respective threats originates 
from 2014, when Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea as well as Daesh’s 
extensive engagement in conventional and unconventional warfare caused the escalation 
of information war to an unprecedented scale. The severe threats of information warfare 
were recognised by the EU, NATO, and the Member States who have been developing 
defence mechanisms while emphasising the importance of social freedoms. Therefore, 
debates on the threats of information warfare in media, with a particular focus on digital 
media, have gained momentum. In turn, information warfare has also become a highly 
topical matter in media. Therefore, the thesis studies the framing of information warfare 
in Estonian and Irish online news media in 2014-2017 and interprets the differences and 
similarities in the media frames. The thesis employs articles on information warfare 
published in the three most visited Estonian and Irish online news media and applies the 
method of qualitative framing analysis. Three frames are identified in the media 
coverage of both countries: Russia-West confrontation frame, national security frame, 
and truth frame for Estonia, and national security frame, Russia-West confrontation 
frame, and technology and extremism frame for Ireland. The comparative analysis finds 
that the media frames reflect the different historical backgrounds of the countries, as the 
Estonian media frames tend to be politically more motivated to reinforce the hostility of 
Russia and call the Western democracies for unity. The second main difference in the 
frames is the coverage on extremism, principally on the example of Daesh, which was 
largely neglected in Estonian media for the perceived distance, but more covered in 
Irish media for relative closeness through the impact on the UK. Nevertheless, above 
all, the frames emphasised the common values and principles of the two countries.  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Introduction 
Technological developments in the past few decades have had a remarkable impact on 
warfare. Faster communication times, closer international networks, and more complex 
dynamics of conflicts are only few examples of the profound changes that are currently 
in progress. While in the 20th century, wars were described as large-scale multi-year 
conflicts between states through ground invasion, then the 21st century warfare is visibly 
shifting to the digital frontier with limited operations on the ground conducted by 
special forces (Slaughter, 2011). The increasing importance of the digital dimension has 
also entailed greater interest in information warfare by states, non-state actors, and 
individuals, as such non-kinetic forms of warfare can be employed at minimum cost 
with extensive damage. Both offensive and defensive capabilities are being researched 
and developed in all subareas of information warfare, of which cyber warfare and 
psychological operations appear as particularly topical in current public debates.  
Information warfare is also a highly topical matter on the European Union’s (EU) 
security agenda. The leaders of the EU and Member States have unanimously 
recognised information warfare as a threat to the security of the union and work is in 
progress to develop coordinated defence mechanisms, which also involve deepened 
cooperation with NATO. (European Commission, 2017) Therefore, building resilience 
and advancing the ability to counter the threats of information warfare have been set as 
priorities both at the supranational and state level. While there is general political 
consensus on acknowledging the threats, the perception of information warfare differs 
across the Member States, as states have different exposure to information warfare. For 
this reason, it is essential that the Member States would comprehend the varying 
perspectives in order to facilitate more informed communication and efficient interstate 
cooperation, as well as accommodate greater awareness within and between societies. 
The rise of the digital dimension has also increased the power of media. Although media 
has long been an influential tool of communication for shaping attitudes in societies, the 
emergence of online media has multiplied the opportunities of states and other actors to 
spread their ideas and narratives. Therefore, online media has become a strategic 
battlefield of information warfare, which is used by various actors to gain superiority. 
Research on information warfare in online media has so far mainly focused on the 
questions how actors conduct information warfare and how to counter such attacks. 
Case studies commonly revolve around Russia and Daesh, but extensive research on 
information warfare has also been carried out in the context of hybrid warfare. (See 
Ingram, 2014; Jaitner, 2015; Wither, 2016) While authors have published studies on the 
framing of certain events that represent cases of the use of information warfare, there 
appear to be no published studies on the framing of the phenomenon of information 
warfare in media. Therefore, considering the influential role of media in shaping public 
opinion, the need for research on the framing of information warfare is evident. 
Acknowledging the priority given to countering the threats of information warfare in the 
EU and recognising the influential role of online media in shaping public opinion, the 
thesis aims to fill the gap in research and study how information warfare has been 
framed in online news media. The author seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis on 
the media frames of information warfare specific to Estonia and Ireland and add value 
by comparing the similarities and differences in the two cases. Therefore, the thesis 
seeks to contribute both to the country-specific research on the framing of information 
warfare as well as to the EU-level research to create a better understanding of the 
different perspectives on information warfare. The thesis is structured in three main 
parts: theoretical framework, methodology, and framing analysis. First, the theoretical 
framework is divided into two parts: the concept of information warfare, involving the 
key developments and definitions, and framing theory, involving definitions and media 
frames. Second, the methodology comprises four parts: case selection, online news 
media, time frame, and qualitative framing analysis. Finally, the framing analysis has 
!6
four parts: Estonian media frames, Irish media frames, comparative analysis, and 
limitations.  
The empirical analysis is designed as a comparative study of two cases, involving 
Estonia and Ireland as small EU Member States with different positions on military 
alignment. The time frame for the study is 2014-2017, which covers the latest period 
characterised by the rise of information warfare challenges. The research is based on 
articles retrieved from the three most visited online news media of Estonia and Ireland, 
which according to Alexa’s country-specific rankings (2018a) are Postimees.ee, 
Delfi.ee, and Err.ee for Estonia (Alexa, 2018b) and Independent.ie, Irishtimes.com, and 
Thejournal.ie for Ireland (Alexa, 2018c). The author uses the search phrase 
“infosõda” (i.e., the Estonian equivalent for information warfare and information war) 
in Estonian media and the phrases “information warfare” and “information war” in Irish 
media. Adding the phrase “information war” is substantiated by the common use of the 
phrase as the equivalent of  “information warfare” (see Qualitative framing analysis p. 
26). Therefore, the research employs the method of qualitative framing analysis and 
takes the inductive approach to identifying the media frames. The author uses an 
individual news article as unit of analysis and identifies the media frames through the 
combination of multiple readings of the articles and searching for framing devices in the 
texts. In terms of framing devices, the study involves the rhetorical devices of 
keywords, word choice, and exemplars as well as the technical devices of sources of 
information and quotes in the articles. Finally, the identified media frames in Estonian 
and Irish online news media are examined independently and comparatively. The study 
aims to answer the two following research questions: 
Research question 1: How has information warfare been framed in Estonian 
and Irish online news media in 2014-2017? 
Research question 2: What are the main differences and similarities in the 
framing of information warfare in Estonian and Irish online news media in 
2014-2017? 
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As the main sources of information, the author would highlight the works of Entman 
(1993), Scheufele (1999), Ventre (2016), Johnson-Cartee (2005), Hutchinson (2006), de 
Vreese (2005), Linström and Marais (2012), and as described above, the three most 
visited Estonian and Irish online news media, which provided the data for conducting 
the framing analysis. The author would also like to thank the thesis supervisor Maili 
Vilson for the support and guidance.  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Theoretical framework 
Concept of information warfare 
Information warfare is set as the central concept of the thesis and the following chapter 
aims to create a conceptual framework for the analysis below. In order to place the 
concept in a political context, the first part will provide an overview of the key 
developments in information warfare and describe how has information warfare been 
employed by different actors. The second part will then examine three definitions of the 
concept and explain the approach to information warfare in this study. 
Developments 
Although information warfare is often discussed in the context of information age, the 
roots of the concept date back to the 5th century BC. From the time originates the 
military classic and the first known study of the planning and conduct of military 
operations The Art of War, which is attributed to the Chinese general and strategist 
Sunzi or Sun Tzu. One of the most famous statements in the work declares: “All 
warfare is based on deception” (Smith, 2017), which emphasises the fundamental role 
of the use or misuse of information in warfare and thus captures the core idea of 
information warfare. Therefore, until the emergence of modern communications 
technology in the 20th  century, information warfare remained limited to subareas, such 
as misinformation, deception, and propaganda. Then the invention of the radio laid the 
foundation for electronic warfare, but the most rapid development of information 
warfare began with the invention of the microchip, which led to the use of computers on 
the battlefield and the rise of cyber warfare. (Mackey, 2017) The following chapter will 
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introduce the political context and discuss some of the key developments since the late 
20th century that have shaped the modern thinking of information warfare. The events 
include the Gulf War of 1990-1991, 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent invasion of 
Iraq, Russia’s cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, Russia-Georgia war of 2008, 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Daesh’s information warfare.  
In the early 1990s, as the Cold War was ending, the focus of information warfare was 
shifting from propaganda to the electronic computing and communications technology, 
which was employed in battlefield intelligence, targeting, and command and control. 
Although the use of information warfare was principally military in character and 
relevant in the context of war, states also engaged in media management. (Hutchinson, 
2006, p. 214) According to Hutchinson (Ibid., p. 214), the US actions in the Gulf War of 
1990-1991 provided a prime example of both overwhelming technological superiority 
and a masterful media campaign, which reflected the lessons learned from the failures 
of the Vietnam War of 1955-1975, where the spreading of uncontrolled information and 
images had led to the loss of public support and subsequently the war. Stauber (1995) 
describes that the US government and military officials used sophisticated tactics of 
information control in the Gulf War, which involved the constraining and controlling 
reporters and running a comprehensive public relations campaign to ensure the 
prevalence of the government version of events. As Hutchinson (2006, p. 214) notes: “It 
was becoming clear that modern wars were also media wars.”  
The importance of communications is inevitable from the perspective of information 
warfare. Buchanan (2018) explains that the most influential developments in 
communications originate from before or during World War II, such as television 
services becoming media of mass communication. Since then, the lines of development 
have remained largely the same, but in the 21st century, the advanced technological 
capabilities have become even more merged with media management (Hutchinson, 
2006, p. 215). Similarly, manipulations with information in mass media was already a 
common practice in World War II, but the techniques for influencing the public have 
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been refined and today manipulations are used in combination with modern 
communications technology also during peacetime (Rose, 2000, p. 34). Kumar (2006, p. 
54) describes the given developments in the early 2000s in light of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and the subsequent invasion of Iraq. The article argues that the US 
administration used the favourable public opinion and principal compliance of media to 
take advantage of the misconceptions about Iraq’s connections with the 9/11 attacks in 
order to advance the government’s interests through the invasion. Therefore, as there 
had been a rise of national sentiments after the 9/11 attacks and media followed the 
administration’s line, the government had possessed remarkable influence over the mass 
perception in the US. (Ibid., p. 54) In the development of information warfare, the case 
presents an example of large-scale psychological warfare through the spread of 
misinformation, which was used to affect the audiences in the US and abroad.  
In 2007, the world’s first “coordinated cyber-attack against a nation state” was carried 
out, as Estonia experienced a series of denial of service attacks shortly after relocating a 
Soviet-era war memorial (Keating, 2010). The attacks were described as the first time 
when the national security of a nation was threatened by a botnet, which was 
particularly true because Estonia is an “online country” reliant on Internet connectivity 
(Davis, 2007). Evron (2017) explains that both government and public websites were 
targeted, including that of the Estonian prime minister, president, and government, as 
well as banks, news media, telecommunications companies, schools, etc. There had also 
been calls to unrest on Russian-language Internet forums, which were aimed to amplify 
the outrage for relocating the memorial and thus incite hostility within the society 
(Ibid.) Although there was no official evidence, Estonia accused Russia of the attacks, 
referring to the circumstances, while Russia denied government involvement, calling 
the claims groundless. (Davis, 2007) Nevertheless, the cyber attacks against Estonia are 
often viewed as the first in the series of cases, in which Russia demonstrates its 
information warfare capabilities (Tamkin, 2017). 
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According to Iasiello (2017, p. 52), during the war against Georgia in 2008, Russia was 
able to simultaneously employ cyber attacks and conventional military operations for 
the first time, while also engaging propaganda, information control, and disinformation 
campaigns. White (2018, p. 4) describes that in media, Russia’s aim was to control the 
international flow of information, endorse the narrative of Russian troops protecting 
Russian citizens on Georgian territory, and present Georgia as the aggressor in the 
conflict. However, Vendil Pallin and Westerlund (2009, p. 401) argue that due to the 
self-admitted deficiencies in the information-technical and information-psychological 
domains of Russia’s information warfare, including failures with command and control, 
electronic warfare, and disinformation campaign, Georgia was able to gain victory in 
the information sphere regardless of their loss on the physical battlefield. Therefore, as 
reflects from the literature, the war with Georgia forced Russia to rethink its tactics to 
avoid similar shortcomings in the future, as the victory in such confrontations depends 
largely on whose narrative will prevail. 
In 2014, six years after the war against Georgia, Russia engaged in a conflict against 
Ukraine and annexed Crimea, which has been recognised as a case of hybrid warfare. 
Russia demonstrated that it had learned the lessons from Georgia and improved its 
tactics in several aspects. According to Ruiz (2017), in the information-technical area, 
Russia employed cyber attacks and cyber espionage against Crimea throughout the 
operation from early stages until after the annexation. In the information-psychological 
area, it was described that the main tactics included propaganda, disinformation, denial, 
and deception (Ibid.). Further, in order to influence the public opinion towards 
supporting the pro-Russian version of events, Russia engaged in creating favourable 
television broadcasts as well as news items, blog content, and social media posts 
(Kofman, Rojansky, 2015). Finally, Snegovaya (2015, p. 15) explains how Russia was 
able to keep the US and NATO from intervening thanks to firmly denying its 
involvement in Crimea and managed to annex Crimea in a way that would seemingly 
follow the democratic procedures. The article also notes that only after the annexation 
of Crimea, Russia accused the Western states of having double standards on foreign 
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troop deployment, as the aggressor did not need to rely on the tactics of denial any 
longer (Snegovaya, 2015, p. 15). 
However, information warfare has not only been employed by states, and the most 
prominent example is the terrorist organisation Daesh, also known as the Islamic State, 
IS, ISIS or ISIL. The origins of Daesh date back to 1999 and the organisation expanded 
from then on, culminating with the caliphate announcement and establishment of the 
Islamic State in 2014. (Zgryziewicz, 2015, p. 15) Although by 2018, Daesh has lost 
98% of the territory it once held in Iraq and Syria (Mills, 2018), the organisation has 
enjoyed success in terrorism activities and information campaigns in recent years. As 
Misra (2015) explains, aiming to fulfil the apocalyptic prophecy of the victory of the 
Islamic State by defeating all enemies, Daesh has developed a powerful information 
strategy, which includes gaining supporters, uniting Sunni Muslims, frightening 
adversaries, and spreading information about the caliphate. Daesh has been described to 
used both direct communication as well as social media platforms, whereas the gains 
from the effective and flexible use of social media have been considered particularly 
remarkable (Awan, 2017). Zgryziewicz (2015, p. 41) then discusses in greater detail 
how the social media platforms are organised in large and small communities, which 
enables to recover quickly from attacks on the communities, making Daesh difficult to 
eliminate. 
The discussion above has provided an overview of some of the key developments in 
information warfare since the end of the Cold War. Although the author acknowledges 
that the earlier events have had a remarkable impact on the thinking of information 
warfare, the more recent developments were preferred to introduce the modern issues, 
which are of greater priority considering the focus of the empirical analysis on media 
frames from 2014-2017. In other words, the introduction of the recent events also 
carried the purpose of providing background information for the analysis and discussing 
the political context, in which the media frames will be viewed. Further, the chapter has 
presented the evolving character of the concept and illustrated how different actors 
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conduct information warfare. The cases also demonstrate the complex challenges of 
information warfare, which are principally related to the diversity of subareas and 
battlefields. However, in order to gain a more concise understanding of information 
warfare, the following chapter will examine three definitions to the concept. 
Definitions 
As the overview of the developments in information warfare has illustrated the complex 
nature of the concept, the author will now seek to narrow the discussion and focus on 
the definitions of information warfare. Three widely cited definitions will be discussed 
and they then used to formulate the approach to information warfare in this thesis. 
The first definition has been proposed by Winn Schwartau in 1994:  
“Information warfare is an electronic conflict in which information is a 
strategic asset worthy of conquest or destruction. Computers and other 
communications and information systems become attractive first-strike 
targets.” (cited in Ventre, 2016, p. 267) 
The definition is very characteristic to the understanding of information warfare in the 
1990s, as it concentrates on the military domain and the context of war as well as 
prioritises the role of information and communications technology (see Developments, 
p. 10). As Schwartau’s definition limits the concept only to electronic conflicts, it takes 
a narrow and essentially military approach on security. On the other hand, emphasising 
the importance of information per se and recognising it as a strategic asset also implies 
more modern thinking of information in warfare, as the shift from focusing on 
technology to include information as such appeared more broadly around the turn of the 
millennium (Hutchinson, 2006, p. 213).  
The author of the second definition is Daniel Ventre and it originates from 2008:  
“The aggressive/defensive use of information space components (which are 
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information and information systems) to reach/protect the sovereignty of a 
nation through actions conducted in times of peace, crisis or conflict.” (cited in 
Ventre, 2016, p. 271) 
In many aspects, Ventre’s definition characterises the modern approach to information 
warfare. First and foremost, Ventre places information warfare not only in the context of 
war, but also connects the concept with periods of peace and crisis. Therefore, unlike in 
the 1990s, the thinking of information warfare had changed to consider it as a constant 
phenomenon in the previous decade. The reference to the use of information 
environment components, which can be both tangible and intangible elements, also 
provides a broader set of tactics compared to the electronic or cyber warfare in 
Schwartau’s definition. However, Ventre limits the aim of information warfare to 
“reaching or protecting the sovereignty of a nation”, which may be too restrictive in 
regard to the type of actors, given the example of Daesh that is essentially a Sunni 
religious group. 
The third definition is by Rianne van Vuuren (2015) from 2015: 
“Information warfare is defined as actions focused on destabilising or 
manipulating the core information networks of a state or entities in society with 
the aim to influence the ability and will to project power as well as efforts to 
counter similar attacks by an opposing entity and/or state.” 
The definition by van Vuuren illustrates the fundamental shift in the conceptual thinking 
of information warfare in the past two decades: while Schwartau placed information 
warfare in the narrow context of war, then van Vuuren has moved further to also include 
the civilian and social sphere. Further, as van Vuuren’s definition involves both states 
and entities in societies, it overcomes the limits of Ventre’s state-centric approach to 
correspond to the modern circumstances and capture the different types of actors 
engaged in information warfare. The focus on core information networks as the object 
of destabilisation or manipulation allows to fit the broad spectrum of subareas and 
security issues in the definition.  
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In the following analysis, the understanding of the concept of information warfare will 
be based upon the same principles as presented in the definition by van Vuuren. The 
discussion on the elements of the definition has proven the good fit of the approach with 
the contemporary circumstances, particularly in regard to the inclusion of the civilian 
sphere and different kind of actors. However, the author will also take an element from 
Ventre’s definition, which is the understanding of information warfare as a constant 
phenomenon, visible throughout the periods of peace, crisis, and conflict. Therefore, the 
thesis will be based on a comprehensive approach to information warfare and aim to 
involve diverse type of instances in the framing analysis.  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Framing theory 
This chapter will introduce framing theory, which serves as the theoretical foundation of 
the empirical analysis. The first part examines the definitions of frames and framing as 
well as explains the conceptual distinction between individual and media frames. The 
second and final part focuses on media frames and discusses the concept in greater 
detail.  
Definitions 
According to van Gorp (2007, p. 60), the roots of framing theory date back to the first 
half of the 20th century and originate from cognitive psychology and anthropology. 
From the 1970s, the concept of framing has also been taken over by other disciplines, 
e.g., sociology, economics, linguistics, communication science, and public relations 
research (Ibid.). Therefore, because of the diverse use of the concept, there are different 
kind of definitions available for the concepts of frames and framing. In order to avoid 
conceptual vagueness, the author will examine four definitions of key importance from 
the perspective of the thesis.  
One of the most recognised definitions to framing has been proposed by Entman (1993, 
p. 52), who emphasises social interaction as the essence of framing: 
“Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described.” 
Although not explicitly stated, the definition implies the presence of a communication 
source, which can be a news medium, political leader, news consumer, etc (Johnson-
Cartee, 2005, p. 24). In the process of framing, communicators interact with their 
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sources and other actors, and the receivers interact with the content and other receivers, 
which then becomes a multi-level interplay (van Gorp, 2007, p. 64). As the definition 
suggests, framing is about determining certain problems, identifying the reasons for the 
problems, evaluating the causal forces and their effects, and finally proposing solutions 
and outcomes for the matter. However, all of the four functions may not be included in 
one frame occurring in a text, as framing can also involve fewer. (Entman, 1993, p. 52) 
Second, the concept of frame has been defined by Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, 
Bliss, and Ghanem (1991, cited in Johnson-Cartee, 2005, p. 24) as follows: 
“A frame is a central organising idea for news content that supplies a context 
and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, 
and elaboration.” 
Although the definition describes frame as “a central organising idea”, it shall be 
emphasised that the actual frame does not appear in the content, thus the text and the 
frame have to be distinguished from each other (van Gorp, 2007, p. 63). Frames and 
their social construction are both invisible, as the use of frames is natural and often 
goes unnoticed (Gamson et al., 1992, p. 374). Further, there are frames that are applied 
as well as frames that could be applied and outnumber the former as alternatives. 
Distinguishing the different frames helps to understand potential approaches to certain 
events, as the interpretation can depend to a great extent on the frame. (van Gorp, 2007, 
p. 62) The reason for such influence is that frames spotlight certain elements of reality 
and conceal others (Entman, 1993, p. 53), as also explained in the definition above by 
Tankard et al.  
Third, from the perspective of the following empirical analysis, it is essential to 
elaborate on the conceptual distinction between individual and media frames. Scheufele 
has based the distinction on Kinder and Sanders (1990, cited in Scheufele, 1999, p. 
106):  
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“(…) frames serve both as “devices embedded in political discourse,” which is 
equivalent to the concept of media frames, and as “internal structures of the 
mind,” which is equivalent to individual frames.” 
Rather than focusing on individual frames and studying the “mentally stored clusters of 
ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (Entman, 1993, p. 53), the 
author has chosen to concentrate on media frames and interpret how has information 
warfare been presented in media. The essence of media framing is captured in the 
following definition: 
“By framing social and political issues in specific ways, news organisations 
declare the underlying causes and likely consequences of a problem and 
establish criteria for evaluating potential remedies of the problem.” (Nelson, 
Clawson, Oxley, 1997 cited in Johnson-Cartee, 2005, pp. 25-26) 
The definition is close to the definitions of framing and frame discussed above, but it is 
more specific in defining the fields of research, as the authors focus more specifically 
on social and political issues. Therefore, the three definitions form an integral 
conceptual foundation for the study of the media frames of information warfare. 
Media framing 
As described above, media frames are understood as abstractions or devices that 
organise and structure the meaning of certain problems. Media frames are prioritised for 
their ability to shape individuals’ perception of the problems and thus impact public 
opinion, which in turn explains the importance of conducting research on media framing 
and effects. Therefore, in order to gain a deeper understanding of media framing, the 
following chapter will discuss the concept of media framing in relation to the 
framework of social constructivism, framing as part of the communication process, 
approaches to identifying media frames, and the key characteristics of media frames. 
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According to Scheufele (1999, p. 105), the current stage of research on media effects, 
which started in the early 1980s, is characterised by social constructivism. In principle, 
social constructivism is concerned with “the creation and institutionalisation of reality 
in social interaction” (Berger, Luckmann, 1966 cited in van Gorp, 2007, p. 62). 
Therefore, in a constructivist media effects model, audiences create their own version of 
reality, which is a combination of personal experience, interactions with other actors, 
and selected media frames (Neuman, Just, Crigler, 1992 cited in Scheufele, 1999, p. 
105). Acknowledging the importance of media frames, one also has to consider the role 
of media makers. Entman (1993, p. 54) and other authors have recognised the influence 
of applying a range of persistent frames in media, which implies certain control over 
alternative frames. Consequently, when individuals construct the social reality, they are 
partly dependent on the frames made available by journalists. (van Gorp, 2007, p. 62) 
The described model of dependency illustrates the nuanced characters of both social 
interactions as well as media framing. 
The discussion on the constructivist media effects model has implied the two-sided 
nature of media frames: on the one hand, it emphasises the effects on the audience, and 
on the other hand, it involves research on the media content (Knudsen, 2014, p. 209). 
Therefore, focusing on the latter can be conditionally considered as the first step in 
studying the communication process in framing, although the influences of media 
frames are also inseparable from the content creators. In a more nuanced approach to 
framing, Entman. Matthes, and Pellicano (2009, p. 178) distinguish between the 
categories of strategic framing, journalistic framing, frames in media content, and 
framing effects. Due to the limited scope of the thesis, the empirical analysis will focus 
on frames in media content, which entails examining “the selection and salience of 
certain aspects of an issue by exploring images, stereotypes, metaphors, actors, and 
messages” (Ibid., p. 180). Matthes and Kohring (2008, p. 259) distinguish between five 
methodological approaches for identifying media frames: hermeneutic, linguistic, 
manual holistic, computer-assisted, and deductive approach. The first two, the 
hermeneutic and linguistic approach, belong to the broader category of qualitative frame 
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analysis (Entman et al., 2009, p. 180), which appears as a more common term in 
literature and will thus be used in the empirical analysis (see Qualitative framing 
analysis, p. 26). 
The final part of the discussion will address some of the key characteristics of media 
frames. According to Entman (1993, p. 52), frames in the news can be identified by “the 
presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of 
information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or 
judgments.” In a similar manner, Pan and Kosicki (1993, p. 56) find that frames appear 
in media content through different framing devices, such as metaphors, exemplars, 
catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. In other words, framing devices that make 
a reference to the same idea are identifiable as parts of a distinguishable theme or frame 
(van Gorp, 2007, p. 64). Further, frames illuminate certain information about a subject 
and thereby aim to make it more memorable for the audience. In order to make some 
information more salient, media makers apply different techniques, such as placement, 
repetition, but also using cultural links and symbols. (Entman, 1993, p. 53) However, 
the effect on the audience cannot be automatically assumed, as it also depends on the 
individual frames of the receivers (van Gorp, 2007, p. 63), which then reinforces the 
idea of individual and media frames as distinct but integrated categories. 
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Methodology 
This chapter introduces the methodological approach to the empirical research. The first 
part discusses case selection and the reasons for choosing Estonia and Ireland as the two 
cases for the comparative study. The second part presents the three Estonian and three 
Irish online news media, where the content for the framing analysis was extracted. The 
third part provides the timeframe for the analysis, and finally, the fourth part explains 
how the qualitative framing analysis was conducted. Therefore, the chapter creates a 
methodological basis for answering the following research questions in the empirical 
analysis: 
Research question 1: How has information warfare been framed in Estonian 
and Irish online news media in 2014-2017? 
Research question 2: What are the main differences and similarities in the 
framing of information warfare in Estonian and Irish online news media in 
2014-2017? 
Case selection 
Estonia and Ireland are relatively small European countries with populations of 
comparable size: approximately 1.3 million (Statistics Estonia, 2017) and 4.8 million 
(Central Statistics Office, 2017) people respectively. Both states are democratic 
parliamentary republics and members of the United Nations (UN) (United Nations, 
2018), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 
2018), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (OSCE, 2018), 
and the EU (European Union, 2018a). While Ireland accessed the EU in 1973 
(European Union, 2018b), then Estonia over three decades later, in 2004 (European 
Union 2018c). In addition, both countries have adopted the euro, but only Estonia is a 
member of the Schengen area, as Ireland has negotiated an opt-out from the Schengen 
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agreement. (European Union, 2018b; European Union 2018c) In light of current 
political developments in the EU, particularly Brexit, the leaders of both countries have 
emphasised their support for the unity of the EU (Cooper, 2017). Moreover, Estonia and 
Ireland along with other small liberal EU states view each other as natural allies for 
sharing common values and a vision for deepening the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) (Donohoe, 2018). 
However, there is a particular difference between Estonia and Ireland, which is related 
to their positions on the alignment with military alliances. Since the 1930s, Ireland has 
been committed to a policy of military neutrality, which is understood as “non-
membership of military alliances” (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). In 
Cottey’s view (2018, p. 175), the anti-militarist and normative foreign policy is not only 
traditional to Ireland’s political culture, but it has become part of their national identity. 
In terms of EU membership, Ireland’s military neutrality is guaranteed under the Lisbon 
Treaty (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018). Nevertheless, as the later 
prime minister Enda Kenny put it in 2006: “Truth is, Ireland is not neutral. We are 
merely unaligned” (cited in Smyth, 2017a). Kenny seems to have been right, 
considering that Ireland joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme in 1999 
(NATO, 2018) and has since become increasingly involved in the European military 
cooperation and integration, including the low-profile NATO partnership as well as the 
EU structures (Cottey, 2018). Some of the examples of Ireland’s participation in the EU 
military cooperation structures are the Nordic Battlegroups and most notably the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) as one of the 25 EU member states 
involved. (Finn, 2018; European Council, 2017) 
Estonia, on the other hand, accessed NATO in 2004 and considers active involvement as 
a strategic priority of Estonian security and defence policy. In fact, Estonia started 
participating in international operations already in 1995, only four years after regaining 
its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017a) 
For Estonia, the broader European integration process along with the accession to 
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NATO and the EU were of vital importance for historical reasons, and are now seen as 
the fundamental elements for the country’s lasting endurance. For this reason, Estonia 
has been in strong favour of such developments as establishing PESCO, bringing the 
EU battlegroups in actual use, securing the Nordic-Baltic region with NATO troops, etc 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017b). Therefore, as reflects from the discussion, the key 
difference compared to Ireland is Estonia’s NATO membership as aligning with a 
military alliance. Given the relative similarity of Estonia’s and Ireland’s political 
profiles, the matter of military alignment along with the different historical and 
geopolitical backgrounds provide an interesting nuance worth further investigation also 
in the context of media frames, which will be discussed in the comparative analysis (see 
Comparative analysis, p. 51) 
Online news media 
The empirical analysis on the framing of information warfare concentrated on online 
news media as data sources. Online news media were chosen because of the increasing 
use of computers and reliance on Internet sources. According to Eurostat (2018), 71% of 
people living in the EU used the Internet on a daily basis or almost every day in 2016, 
whereas 70% of all Internet users read news online. Furthermore, online news media 
publish more articles than print media and thus provide more data for analysis. Finally, 
online news media enable an efficient and precise search for articles, as users are able to 
search for certain words or phrases in a preferred time frame. Therefore, for the purpose 
of collecting sufficient amount of data for the framing analysis, the research involvesd 
the three most visited online news media of Estonia and Ireland, which were selected 
according to Alexa’s country-specific ranking. Alexa (2018a) is recognised as one of the 
most reputable competitive intelligence tools around the world and thus counts as a 
reliable source of information. The calculation for a country-specific rank of a website 
combines the estimated average of daily unique visitors and estimated number of page 
views in the past month, using data from Alexa’s global traffic panel that samples 
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millions of Internet users as well as data from direct sources that have installed the 
Alexa script on their website and allow Alexa to measure the traffic. (Alexa, 2018a) As 
the country-specific rankings combine websites of all kinds and origins, the top three 
Estonian and Irish news media were found from the respective country’s list through a 
careful manual search. Due to the limits of Alexa’s public data, it was not possible to 
access the rankings from the time period covered in the study, 2014-2017, therefore, the 
rankings have been referred to as of 25 April 2018. However, given the timely 
proximity, the choice of sources can be considered valid. 
Time frame 
The time frame for the analysis was limited to four years from 2014 to 2017, thus 
covering the most recent developments in the framing of information warfare. Given 
that the thesis does not study a certain event but the phenomenon of information 
warfare, the author faced the inevitable issue of selecting a particular time frame. 
Table 1. Most visited Estonian online news media. (Alexa, 2018b)




Table 2. Most visited Irish online news media. (Alexa, 2018c)





Although the decision to focus on the most recent period provided the natural choice of 
the previous year as an ending point, one could argue for several starting points as being 
most suitable for the study. Consequently, the author acknowledges that the starting 
point of 2014 can be contested, but there are indeed two influential reasons for selecting 
this particular year. First, the 2014 Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea has been 
recognised as the escalation of information war to an unprecedented scale (Applebaum, 
2014; Shekhovtsov, 2015), which together with the subsequent war in eastern Ukraine 
“represent the culmination of an evolutionary process in Russian information warfare 
theory and practice” (Giles, 2016, p. 4). Second, in the same year, Daesh engaged in 
extensive conventional and information warfare, which allowed them to capture 
territory in Iraq and Syria as well as enabled the organisation to become a global 
phenomenon (Gambhir, 2016). The increasing threats of information warfare were 
recognised by the EU, NATO, and the member states, which led the organisations to 
discuss advanced cooperation and establish the European Centre of Excellence for 
Countering Hybrid Treats in 2017 (European Union External Action, 2017). The author 
finds that the cases demonstrate the rise of information warfare issues in 2014, but 
emphasises that the framing analysis covering the period of 2014-2017 also included all 
other cases of information warfare in the selected online news media. 
Qualitative framing analysis 
As discussed in the section Media framing (see p. 20), there are various methodological 
approaches to conducting framing analysis, which are in nature qualitative, quantitative, 
or a combination of the two. Given the aim of the thesis to gain an in-depth 
understanding of how information warfare has been framed in online news media, the 
author has chosen the qualitative approach, which facilitates the quality of context-
sensitivity and enables to emphasise the cultural and political content of news frames 
(Linström, Marais, 2012, p. 27). Qualitative framing analysis requires comprehensive 
work with the texts and approaching the content in a holistic manner to identify the 
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frames. Connolly-Ahern and Broadway (2008, p. 369) have highlighted the following 
advantages of qualitative framing analysis:  
“(…) it (a) examines the key words, metaphors, narratives, and so on, in 
context of the text as a whole; (b) identifies what was left out of the frame as 
well as what was included; and (c) recognises that the words repeated most 
often in a text may not be the most important.” 
Therefore, as opposed to the quantitative approach, qualitative framing research does 
not entail creating categories of news texts and discourse with the aim to measure their 
size or count their frequency (Reese, 2007 cited in Linström, Marais, 2012, pp. 25-26), 
but it is rather an interpretative approach to examine phenomena in a holistic manner.  
In order answer the first research question and explain how information warfare has 
been framed in Estonian and Irish online news media in 2014-2017, the author had to 
begin by collecting the articles on information warfare from the selected Estonian and 
Irish online news media in the given time frame. For Estonia, the employed search word 
was “infosõda” (i.e., the Estonian equivalent for information warfare and information 
war), and for Ireland, the search phrases were “information warfare” and “information 
war”. The reason for adding the phrase “information war” was the limited number of 
results to the original search phrase (see Irish media frames, p. 40), which appeared to 
be a matter of the use of language in media, as the articles including the phrase 
“information war” provided sufficient information also on “information warfare”. 
Therefore, as the articles were collected separately for both countries, the next step was 
to identify the frames. The unit of analysis was an individual news article, which 
provided a clear and comprehensible structure for working with the articles. The 
selection of frames was based on the inductive approach, which means that the frames 
were identified in the process of analysing the content of each individual article. (de 
Vreese, 2005, p. 53) Although the inductive approach is criticised as being subjective, it 
is in turn flexible and context-sensitive, which enables the researcher to identify the 
frames more precisely (Touri, Koteyko, 2014, 602). In identifying the frames, the author 
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first read the articles multiple times and followed the four-step process proposed by 
Wimmer and Domincik (2006 cited in Linström, Marais, 2012, p. 31): 
• Articles were comparatively distributed into categories;

• The categories were refined;

• Themes were found among the categories;

• The categories were simplified and integrated into coherent frames.

The author also searched for the presence or absence of framing devices in order to 
identify the frames. The choice of the framing devices was guided by the research 
problem (Ibid., p. 31) and to reach the aim of producing a comprehensive analysis of 
framing, both rhetorical and technical devices were included. Therefore, the rhetorical 
devices involved keywords, word choice, and exemplars (Ibid., p. 32), while the 
technical devices included sources of information and quotes in the articles (Pan, 
Kosicki, 1993, p. 60). Combining the two processes of creating categories through 
multiple readings and searching for framing devices enabled to identify three dominant 
frames in both Estonian and Irish online news media. Due to the limited scope of the 
thesis, secondary frames in the articles were not identified. The discussion on the frames 
was substantiated by examples of the quotes, which in parallel illustrated the use of 
sources. In addition, the author aimed to provide diverse examples of the instances 
covered by the frames to create a comprehensive overview of the media frames. Finally, 
the comparative analysis examined the main differences and similarities in the framing 
of information warfare in Estonian and Irish online media in 2014-2017 to answer the 
second research question regarding the differences and similarities of Estonian and Irish 
media frames. For this purpose, the analysis discussed the frames, key aspects of the 
frames, and framing devices in Estonian and Irish media, while elaborating on the 
differences and similarities along with the causes and peculiarities.  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Framing of information warfare 
Estonian media frames 
Following the criteria for the selection of articles as described above (Online news 
media, p. 24), the author found 142 articles from 2014-2017 that employed the term 
“infosõda” (i.e., the Estonian equivalent for information warfare and information war): 
83 articles from Postimees.ee, 17 articles from Delfi.ee, and 42 articles from Err.ee. 
Three major frames were identified in the media coverage: Russia-West confrontation 
frame, national security frame, and truth frame.  
Russia-West confrontation frame 
The Russia-West confrontation frame was most commonly utilised in the coverage of 
information warfare. The frame was constructed through the description of Russia’s 
robust information operations against the Western states along with the discussion on 
the defensive capabilities and reactions of the West. Some of the main keywords that 
Table 3. Identified frames by online news media.







Postimees.ee (n=83) 40 19 24
Delfi.ee (n=17) 6 6 5
Err.ee (n=42) 18 13 11
Total (n=142) 64 38 40
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characterised the frame were “war”, “influence”, “division”, “propaganda”, and 
“manipulation”. The defining idea of the Russia-West confrontation frame was thus to 
illuminate Russia’s war-like assertive actions related to the hostile and manipulative use 
of information against the West with the purpose of dividing the unity of the Western 
organisations, states, and societies to gain superiority. (Tagel, 2016a) In addition, there 
were two decisive judgements about the confrontation: first, Russia is the offender and 
uses its negative reputation to gain an advantage, and second, the West is losing the 
information war. (Nael, 2017) In order to gain a deeper understanding of the Russia-
West confrontation frame, the following discussion will elaborate on the constructed 
roles of both Russia and the West in the context of information warfare. 
The questions why and how Russia conducts information warfare against the West were 
of particular importance in this frame. There was remarkable consistency in describing 
the aims of Russia’s information warfare, both in terms of wording and tone, in line 
with the following example:  
“The aim of the authoritarian Russia’s information warfare has always been to 
undermine the democracies of the Western states, cause instability within the 
societies, amplify the existing ideological, racial, sexual orientation, religious, 
and other such divisions.” (Kiin, 2017) 
The emphasis on the governance regime, i.e., authoritarian Russia versus democratic 
West, was often used to stress the opposition and presumably create a positive cultural 
connection for the Western audiences. On the other hand, the frame favoured 
democracies by describing them as being more vulnerable in information war, given 
that as for their values, democracies cannot equally respond to the type of actions 
employed by the authoritarian Russia (Nael, 2017). For the same reason, Russia’s 
arguments of only engaging in information warfare to answer to the similar hostile 
actions by the West were rejected and ridiculed (Laaneots, 2015). As the frame 
separated the causes of Russia’s information warfare from any allegedly provocative 
actions of the West, it insisted that Russia’s aims were predominantly related to 
increasing its influence and achieving information superiority (Tagel, 2016a). 
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The discussion on how Russia conducts information warfare focused on a broad range 
of elements, such as institutions, media, methods, and narratives. Russia’s information 
warfare was understood as a total and exceptionally powerful phenomenon:  
“Russia’s kind of information warfare not only means a maze of disinformation, 
fabrications, information leaks, and cyber sabotage. Russia goes way beyond by 
creating “new reality” and mass hallucinations.” (Kooli, 2014) 
The frame reinforced the notion of Russia’s superiority in information warfare, as it 
described the state’s extensive engagement in developing the respective capabilities. For 
example, several articles addressed the Russian defence minister’s presentation before 
the State Duma, which confirmed the creation of more advanced special information 
forces (Postimees.ee, 2017a). In this case, the utilisation of a high level official source 
also amplified the effect of the announcement. On the contrary, there was an interview 
with a former employee of the Russian troll fabric, which aimed to portray the true 
reality behind the information campaigns through personal experience (Postimees.ee, 
2015a). Further, the discussion on Russia’s information warfare involved Russia’s cyber 
operations and diverse use of media in psychological operations, including news media, 
social media, political blogs, and others of the kind. The spreading of fake news and 
posting pro-Russian comments in media were recognised as the present time threats 
(Tagel, 2016b). Finally, the frame cautioned against Russia’s narratives about the 
internal divides in the Western societies, high terrorist attack threats, and the 
incapability to deal with the migration crisis (Ehand, 2017), which were denied and 
condemned as hostile propaganda.  
A particular characteristic of the Russia-West confrontation frame was the focus on the 
opposition in general rather than describing concrete instances in detail. For example, in 
recent years, Russia has been repeatedly accused of intervening in the domestic politics 
and attempting to manipulate with the elections of several Western states, including the 
US, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (Tagel, 2016a; Nael, 2017; Kiin, 2017). 
However, instead of providing detailed overviews of the events, the instances were 
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mostly utilised as a set of examples to illustrate the more principal or technical 
discussions on Russia’s information warfare: 
“It is well known in Kremlin that when there are elections in some country, it is 
time to intervene — then the conditions for influencing opinions are most 
favourable. The US elections took place, we witnessed that Russia was very 
active. The same will surely happen in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.” 
(Tagel, 2016b) 
Therefore, although the different elements of Russia’s information warfare, which were 
discussed in the previous paragraph, were more dominantly represented in the frame 
than concrete events, the instances of Russia’s interventions were included as part of the 
broader opposition. Moreover, the repeated use of the same set of examples could have 
carried the purpose of making the issue more memorable for the audiences, along with 
the subtle reference to the togetherness of the West under the attacks by Russia.  
Finally, the frame discussed the defensive capabilities and reactions of the West. There 
was common recognition that the Western states needed more efficient coping 
mechanisms against Russia’s information operations, especially while dealing with 
complex matters like Brexit and the rise of populism (Tagel, 2016c; Weber, 2017). In 
the discussions on the defensive measures, the term “propaganda” was much rather 
utilised than “information warfare”, as in the following example: 
“Should we organise counter-propaganda? I think it will not work. We need to 
spend more money to fight with propaganda. First, states need to have their 
own attractive news channels. It is a good idea to create new Russian language 
television channels, analyse facts, rise public awareness, fight with trolls, and 
tell the truth.” (Tagel, 2016a) 
The frame assured that the Western democracies were going to take constructive 
measures against Russia’s information warfare, as described in the example above, 
while opposing their approach to that of Russia. It was prioritised that media freedom 
and ideational pluralism would prevail, while emphasising the need to educate the 
audiences about the threats of Russia’s manipulations with information. (Szostek, 
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Randlo, 2015; Tagel, 2016c) As a concrete counter-measure, the creation of European 
External Action Service was highlighted, which would focus on investigating Russian 
propaganda and collaborating with the eastern partners on media freedom (Aasaru, 
2015). However, despite some optimism, the overall tone of discussion was serious, as 
the Western states have come to realise the severity of the challenges posed by Russia’s 
information warfare.  
National security frame 
The second frame, which was utilised in the coverage of information warfare, was the 
national security frame. This frame described information warfare as a threat to national 
security and it was constructed through three subcategories: threats of information 
warfare to Estonia’s media, Estonia’s psychological security, and the threats of 
information warfare to the national security of other states. The frame involved 
keywords and phrases, such as “integration”, “information space”, “psychological 
defence”, and “information hygiene”. The diverse challenges of information warfare 
were inspected at the state level and exclusively from the defence perspective. 
Abstaining from public debates on offensive capabilities can be related to the Western 
democratic value system and the opposing position that the Western states have taken 
towards the offenders. In this way, the national security frame communicated with the 
Russia-West confrontation frame that was examined in the previous part. However, the 
national security frame was in character more inwards looking and it was concerned 
with the domestic effects as opposed to the international level of analysis of the Russia-
West confrontation frame. 
The main concern of the national security frame was the threat of information warfare 
to media. The discussion focused on the information space of the Russian population in 
Estonia and the available information channels, but also on broader integration issues. 
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The frame utilised a quote by the Estonian president to stress the necessity to ensure 
both the availability of reliable information as well as public awareness about the 
trustworthy channels: 
“We can hear very Estonian-minded opinions in Russian and very Russian-
minded opinions in Estonian. The language does not determine anything. What 
is important, that people know that the Estonian Public Broadcasting is the 
channel where they receive reliable information. This is what you must keep 
here [Estonian Public Broadcasting].” (Kook, 2017a) 
The Russian language television channel under the Estonian Public Broadcasting was 
established only recently and it has not become a prime source of information for the 
Estonian Russian population. For this reason, certain Estonian political powers, most 
prominently the Centre Party, have justified cooperating with the Russian television 
channel PBK (Kook, 2017b), while it has been widely criticised by others. The national 
security frame endorsed the disapproving position, as it condemned the channel for 
serving the interests of the imperialist minded Russia and echoed the criticism towards 
the choice to cooperate with PBK. (Kross, 2017; Velsker, 2017) The frame also 
emphasised the risks related to the Russian government controlled news agency Sputnik 
and was open about the threat of hostile information reaching the Estonian audiences 
(Helme, 2014). The recommended solution in the frame was more direct and constant 
communication with the Russians living in Estonia, which was stressed to require 
comprehensive work with the whole media field, not only the television (Gamzejev, 
2014).  
The second element in the national security frame was the psychological security of the 
Estonian society. On the one hand, the frame was concerned with psychological defence 
and discussed the state engagement in different areas, such as how the state ensures trust 
for the government and defence organs, prevents the spreading of disinformation, 
counters hostile influence operations, etc (Einmann, 2015). Concrete initiatives, such as 
the non-military part of the national defence development plan, were highlighted with 
the purpose of deepening the trust for state institutions in providing psychological 
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defence against information warfare (Salu, 2014). The frame again utilised a quote by a 
high-level source, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu (i.e., 
the Estonian parliament), to increase the salience of psychological defence:  
“(…) it is important to understand that those win in information wars who 
protect their values and principles.” (Nael, 2014) 
In addition to the government-centric approach, the frame discussed the societal aspects 
of psychological security. In a call for “information hygiene”, paraphrasing the more 
well-known phrase of cyber hygiene, a political scientist explained in a playful and 
approachable tone how target audiences engage in information warfare without 
acknowledging it:  
“I mean our own dear compatriots, neighbours, and family members who either 
out of boredom or sincere desire spread this garbage information. Who share 
stories and pictures on their social media accounts without bothering 
themselves even with a brief background check.” (Tüür, 2017) 
As the final point on psychological security, the frame rose the issue of psychological 
warfare within societies through an article, which drew parallels between the situations 
where hostile groups attack experts in public debates and information warfare between 
states, as in both the offenders label, ridicule, or question the authority of the target 
(Minnik, 2016). The comparison allowed to combine the social and political issues in a 
clever manner and educate the audience on the highly prioritised matter of information 
warfare. 
Although the frame concentrated in greater detail on the threats of information warfare 
to Estonia’s national security, it also had an international dimension, which discussed 
the threats in an alternative context. The aim of integrating foreign issues into the frame 
could have been increasing the validity of domestic concerns, as presenting similar 
challenges from elsewhere expands the scope of the problem and makes the case more 
plausible for both the domestic and international audiences. Moreover, it could be seen 
as an aligning device, which demonstrates Estonia as one of the countries under attack 
and fosters solidarity through mutual experiences. Several of the instances covered in 
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the frame concerned Latvia and Lithuania (Laugen, 2016; Postimees.ee, 2014a; 
Postimees.ee, 2015b), who share a similar geopolitical position with Estonia and also 
identify themselves as targets of Russia’s information warfare. For example, the frame 
included a quote by the Lithuanian president on an amendment of legislation that would 
impose severe fines on companies promoting war propaganda:  
“We are facing new and daily information attacks. Their target is our 
population. (…) The constitution obliges us to defend the information space of 
Lithuania. We cannot be weaponless in this war.” (Postimees.ee, 2014a) 
Similarly, Finland was of high interest in this frame (Laugen, 2015; Postimees.ee, 
2014b), which can be explained by its role as a neighbouring country and a close 
partner that shares border with Russia. However, there were also examples from darker 
realities, which represent few of the severest cases of information warfare — Ukraine 
and Russia. (Kannel, 2015; Treufeldt, 2014) The descriptions of the total information 
warfare could be used to raise support for Ukraine, warn the society about the worst 
case scenarios, or highlight the human rights issues in Russia to claim moral superiority. 
The frame utilised saddening narratives and tones of hopelessness when depicting the 
current situation in Russia, which could be concluded with a quote by a Russian human 
rights activist:  
“It is not war anymore but the same kind of occupation that at the level of 
foreign policy is taking place in Crimea. We have no free speech anymore, 
definitively.” (Ibid.) 
Truth frame 
The final frame in the coverage of information warfare was the truth frame. It was 
constructed through discussions on truth and valid information, or the lack thereof, in 
information warfare. The keywords and phrases in this frame were “ethical”, “freedom 
of speech”, “information overload”, “trust”, and “believe”. Therefore, the truth frame 
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functioned as an organising idea for articles concerning the principal ethical problems 
of information warfare, the role of media in the context of information warfare, and the 
lack of truth in information warfare. Moral considerations were central to the frame, as 
the theme was inseparable from one’s values and principles. In this regard, the social 
freedoms of the Western democratic value system were prioritised, including the 
freedom of expression, freedom of press, and others of the kind. The frame made a 
negative moral judgement about neglecting the freedoms by the same token, 
emphasising that countering information warfare could not come at the cost of the 
democratic values.  
The ethical concerns in the truth frame were primarily focused on the options that 
democratic states hold for defending themselves against information warfare. Given the 
core principle to protect the social freedoms, the frame highlighted the great challenges 
that the democratic states experience, as they also need to commit to protecting their 
sovereignty from hostile foreign influence. (Allik, 2014) The issue was illuminated 
through a quote by a recognised journalist who took a deeply concerned tone on the 
matter: 
“But when one side uses all (true, already known from the antique time) 
rhetorical devices and in addition, manipulations enabled by the new media — 
editing videos and audio files, ripping segments out of context, priming, 
framing, etc, based solely on the Jesuit principle that the end justifies the 
means... then what exactly remains for those who play on the so-called white 
side? (Hõbemägi, 2014) 
The use of the “white side” metaphor reinforces the moral contrast between the 
opposing sides and implies the innocence of those included in the abstract group of the 
“wide side”. The frame prioritised moral superiority over winning in the information 
war, as the latter was considered impossible in such asymmetric confrontations, where 
one side employs means that are unthinkable for the other. Moreover, the frame 
contended that the democratic states do not even possess the means, such as state 
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controlled media agencies, to bend the truth on such a scale to engage in extensive 
information warfare. (Mihkelson, 2014) 
The truth frame also focused on the role of media in information warfare. From the 
ethical perspective, the frame insisted that in the context of information warfare, media 
agencies carry particularly high responsibility for the information they communicate to 
the audiences. There was an article by a deputy chancellor of the Estonian Ministry of 
the Interior, which addressed the elements of trust and responsibility in media to 
highlight the threats of information warfare: 
“An institution, publication, or a person with a fine and trustworthy reputation 
has taken direction according to the moral compass. Deviating from the course 
or letting one’s critical sense and attention fade is dangerous, because an 
uncontrolled half-truth or total lie will then quickly transform into a plausible 
fact.” (Koort, 2014) 
The strong emphasis on morality and the fading lines between truth and lies was used to 
draw attention to the risks of information warfare to media freedom, both at the 
domestic and international level. While the frame recognised Estonia’s free media, it 
expressed concern over the global decrease in media freedom, largely caused by 
information warfare. (Postimees.ee, 2015c) The negative influence of information 
operations was also discussed in regard to social media, which was seen to have an 
increasing influence over how the audiences understand certain events or phenomena. 
The frame utilised the example of Daesh that has not only reached the audiences 
through social media, but has managed to catch the attention of news agencies who 
cover Daesh’s social media activity and thus present it to even wider audiences. (Allik, 
2014) 
Finally, the truth frame covered the issue of valid information in the context information 
warfare. The same problem was risen in the quote above in the previous paragraph, as it 
referred to the dangers of uncontrolled half-truths and total lies. Therefore, as the cause 
of the concerns over information validity, the frame described the practice in hostile 
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information operations that blends lies with selected facts to make the lies more 
plausible or confuse the audience (Masso, 2015). True information was said to be 
manipulated and used in a way that would present the subject, for example, a state or 
person, as unreliable and incompetent, while the reason for it may stay unclear for the 
audience. In addition, the speed of presenting information and the large amount of it 
were identified as risks to information validity. (Koort, 2014) Reflecting on the 
challenges that audiences face in information warfare, the frame utilised a capturing 
quote by a journalist: 
“People are learning the grammar of the new reality — distinguishing between 
truth and lies.” (Rebane, 2016) 
Further, the frame included a particular idea about the purpose of establishing multiple 
truths through information warfare, which was seen as part of the status policies of 
global powers. The frame took a severely critical tone regarding such aims of certain 
authoritarian and totalitarian states (Kiin, 2015), most prominently Russia and North 
Korea, and emphasised the need to provide “objective truth” to the populations that only 
have access to the state’s “alternative truth” (Postimees.ee, 2017b). There was an 
example of an organisation that secretly imported memory sticks with information from 
the “free world” to North Korea, which was envisioned to liberate the population’s 
awareness from the strict limits of the regime-controlled information and give the 
people a chance to create their own vision (Ibid.). The frame endorsed the normative 
approach and thus reflected the moral judgments on truth that were characteristic also to 
the other aspects of the frame. 
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Irish media frames 
Following the criteria for the selection of articles as described above (Online news 
media, p. 24), the author found in total 74 articles from 2014-2017 that employed the 
phrases “information warfare” and “information war”. First, 18 articles were found that 
included the phrase “information warfare”: 3 articles from Independent.ie, 12 articles 
from Irishtimes.com, and 3 articles from Thejournal.ie. Second, 56 articles were found 
that included the phrase “information war”: 7 articles from Independent.ie, 42 articles 
from Irishtimes.com, and 7 articles from Thejournal.ie. Three major frames were 
identified in the media coverage: national security frame, Russia-West confrontation 
frame, and technology and extremism frame. 
Table 4. Identified frames for the search phrase “information warfare” by online news 
media.





















Total (n=18) 9 4 5
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National security frame 
In Irish online news media, the most commonly used frame was the national security 
frame. The frame was constructed through describing information warfare as a threat to 
the national security of various Western states, but also to that of Ukraine. Three main 
subcategories were distinguished in the frame: threats to the US national security, 
threats to Ireland’s national security, and threats to the national security of other states. 
Some of the main keywords and phrases were “elections”, “intervene”, “manipulation”, 
and “fake news”. The frame approached the matter of information warfare from the 
defence perspective and the threats were predominantly identified as deriving from an 
external source. (Emmott, 2017; McLaughlin, 2016; Scally, 2017) However, there was 
one peculiarity related to the subcategory of threats to the US national security, which 
also involved the dimension of internal threats and thus provided a multi-level 
discussion on the threats. (Derrig, 2016; Edwards, 2017a) In addition, the incidents in 
the given subcategory were described in greater extent and detail compared to the other 
two subcategories. The particular interest in the US national security by the Irish media 
could be explained by the US status as a superpower with higher relevance to the very 
Table 5. Identified frames for the search phrase “information war” by online news media.





















Total (n=56) 28 12 16
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current topic of information warfare compared to Ireland, but also for the ancestral and 
economic ties between the two countries. 
The US national security frame was primarily focused on the state’s 2016 presidential 
elections, in regard to both external and internal threats of information warfare. As the 
source of the external threat, the frame identified Russia for arguably intervening in the 
respective elections. (Schmidt, Mazzetti, Apuzzo, 2017) The frame utilised a quote by 
the chairman of the House of Representatives homeland security committee, who 
expressed concern over the impact of the intervention in the severest tone: 
“The threat is worse than just espionage. Our democracy itself is at risk. Last 
year, there’s no doubt in my mind that the Russian government tried to 
undermine and influence our elections. They broke into political institutions, 
invaded the privacy of private citizens, spread false propaganda. They created 
discord in the lead-up to a historic vote.” (Edwards, 2017a) 
The quote referred to the intervention as an existential threat to democracy, the 
underlying value of the state, in order to increase the salience of the issue. The claims 
about the intervention originated from the US security agencies, which were identified 
as the initial source of information about Russia’s “influence campaign” during the 
elections. Russia’s aims were described as to support the candidacy of Donald Trump 
and damage that of Hillary Clinton, as the former would fit Russia’s interests better. 
(Lipton, Sanger, Shane, 2016) While the intervention was described as a Soviet style 
propaganda campaign, it was recognised that the effective use of cyberspace enabled 
Russia to carry out a very large-scale operation (Shane, 2017). Finally, the intervention 
was also interpreted as Russia’s response to the  US’ attempts to promote democracy 
and thus undermine Russia’s power in its “near abroad”, most prominently in Georgia 
and Ukraine (Ibid.). 
The internal threats of the US national security were related to the presidential 
campaign of Donald Trump. The frame involved an article, which described the services 
of the political consultancy company Cambridge Analytica and their contribution in the 
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final phase of Trump’s campaign. It was argued that the campaign engaged in 
sophisticated propaganda to manipulate with the voters: 
“Data mining by political campaigns is nothing new, but individualising these 
statistical presumptions through psychological theory, coupled with media that 
can choose who sees which messages, is new.” (Derrig, 2016) 
While it was recognised that the method proved to be highly effective, there were deep 
concerns about the morality of the approach, considering that the main keywords used 
to describe the method were “propagandist” and “manipulative”. (Ibid.) However, 
Trump was not only criticised for hiring the services of Cambridge Analytica, but also 
for his reaction to the claims of Russia’s intervention in the elections. The frame took a 
disapproving tone on Trump’s rejection of the intelligence agencies’ findings on 
Russia’s intervention and considered his attitude improper in the given circumstances. 
(Lipton, Sanger, Shane, 2016) Moreover, there were considerable suspicions that Trump 
had colluded with Russia during the presidential campaign, as various links between the 
members of Trump’s campaign and the Russian government were pointed out, but due 
to the lack of official evidence, the accusations remained moderate. (Irishtimes, 2017) 
Trump’s response was to label the claims as “fake news” (Shear, 2017). 
The second subcategory in the national security frame was Ireland’s national security. 
Although Ireland’s defence matters were not as widely covered in media as the issues of 
the 2016 US presidential elections, there were concerns about the threats of information 
warfare to Ireland’s national security:  
“There is growing evidence which shows that manipulation is underway by 
various State actors aimed at undermining the democratic process. It's 
important that we do all we can to protect the integrity of our democratic 
process here in Ireland.” (Doyle, 2017) 
The quote by an Irish politician addressed the threats of information warfare and 
emphasised the fundamental need to protect the democratic order from the treats. In the 
same way, the frame introduced the new legislation, which criminalised the use of 
internet bots to influence political debate as well as the promotion of fake news on 
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social media. (Doyle, 2017) It was stressed that the aim of the legislation was to counter 
information warfare on social media to protect the democratic process in Ireland from 
interventions similar to the US presidential elections (Ibid.), which reflected the priority 
given to the democratic values. Finally, Ireland’s national security was discussed in the 
context of deepening the EU cooperation in security and defence and the establishment 
of PESCO. Closer cooperation with the EU partners was encouraged in the frame, as it 
was seen to advance the protection of cyberspace and support countering the 
manipulation of information in the future. (Tonra, 2017) 
The final subcategory in the national security frame discussed the threats to the national 
security of several Western states, such as Spain, France, Germany, and Estonia, but 
also that of Ukraine. The frame portrayed the instances of information warfare in the 
given states from the defence perspective and connected the attacks with different 
offenders. For example, the frame described the information attacks of groups based in 
Russia and Venezuela against Spain during Catalonia’s independence referendum, 
aimed to promote the separatist cause and destabilise Spain (Emmott, 2017). Estonia’s 
national security was discussed in relation to the 2007 cyber attacks by Russia and the 
development of the state’s defensive capabilities since then (McLaughlin, 2016). Russia 
was also associated with the hacks into the German parliament’s computer network 
(Scally, 2017), but likewise were there concerns about the US espionage in Germany, 
which included spying on the chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone (Thejournal.ie, 
2014). Similarly, the frame described how a French television network was hacked by 
Daesh (Independent.ie, 2015), but also presented the sabotage accusations against 
Kremlin controlled media by the French then presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron 
in his words as follows: 
“(…) agents of influence which on several occasions spread fake news about me 
personally and my campaign.” (McLaughlin, 2017a) 
Although the frame was in general supportive of the accusations, it took a more critical 
stance on Ukraine, as the state decided to block access to Russian social networks due 
to the threats of propaganda and cyber attacks (McLaughlin, 2017a). The disapproving 
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attitude reflected the idea that social freedoms could not be restricted for the sake of 
countering information warfare, which was in turn approved in the responses of the 
Western states. 
Russia-West confrontation frame 
The second frame in the Irish media coverage of information warfare was the Russia-
West confrontation frame. The frame described Russia’s information campaign against 
the West and the reactions of the Western states. The keywords and phrases utilised in 
the frame included “divide”, “destabilise”, “manipulate”, “propaganda”, and “cyber 
attack”. The frame focused on a range of elements that characterise the confrontation: 
the aim of Russia’s information warfare, Russia’s narratives about the West, and the 
cultural dimension of the confrontation. The attitudes in the frame were supportive of 
the Western states and opposed to Russia, which also reflected from the use of sources. 
On the one hand, Russian sources were quoted to present the opposing ideas and hostile 
messages (Smyth, 2017b), and on the other hand, Western sources were utilised to 
criticise Russia (McLaughlin, 2017b). Therefore, it was evident that the frame 
reinforced the confrontation for the audiences. While the frame involved various 
Western states, it did not include Ireland in the discussion. The reason might have been 
Ireland’s limited exposure to direct information warfare so far, but the attitudes in media 
make a clear statement about the state’s position on the matter.  
The aims of Russia’s information warfare were broadly discussed in the frame and there 
was general consensus that engaging in information warfare served Russia’s interests at 
the highest level. The primary importance of information warfare for Russia was 
interpreted by a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council:  
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"For President Vladimir Putin, information warfare aimed at destabilising its 
geopolitical opponents is nothing less than a cornerstone of Russian foreign 
policy.” (Cluskey, 2017) 
While the quote referred to Russia’s core aim of destabilising the geopolitical 
opponents, it did not specify how the instability would be achieved. The general 
methods were introduced by the former Estonian foreign minister: 
“I think Russia has the more abstract and much broader goal of creating 
confusion in our societies, and discrediting democratic governments and our 
structures, institutions and elections.” (McLaughlin, 2017b) 
The emphasis on “our societies”, “democratic governments”, and “our structures (…)” 
reflected Estonia’s perception and aims, as the state has been directly affected by 
Russia’s information warfare and for defence purposes, continually seeks to reaffirm the 
unity of the Western allies. The frame recognised that despite some delay, Western states 
other than the eastern European countries have also come to realise the severity of the 
threats of Russia’s information warfare (Ibid.). 
The second element in the Russia-West confrontation frame were Russia’s narratives 
about the West, which were seen to be used to influence the opinions of both domestic 
and international audiences. Russia was considered particularly successful in shaping 
the perceptions about the EU at the domestic level, as three quarters of Russians were 
said to have a negative opinion about the union according to a poll. The keywords used 
to describe the union were “hypocritical”, “multicultural”, and “decadent”, which 
followed the government’s narrative. (Smyth, 2017b) In order to introduce how Russia’s 
narratives portrayed the West, the frame utilised a quote by a Latvian translator and 
editor who also countered internet trolling:  
“Russian trolls here say that NATO and the EU are weak and divided; the 
Baltic countries are failed states, where everything is bad and everyone leaves 
to find work; that we have lost our sovereignty to the decadent West and there 
are no gains from EU membership; and that NATO is provoking Russia and 
making us a target.” (McLaughlin, 2017c) 
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Using a source with expertise in countering internet trolling could have carried the 
purpose of presenting the information about Russia’s narratives more reliable. Although 
the given quote was rather specific to the Baltic states, the frame also described Russia’s 
claims that addressed the West more broadly. For example, according to Russian’s 
narratives, the EU was collapsing under the migration crisis, conducting information 
warfare against Russia, struggling with the rise of fascism and nazism, denying any 
moral principles, etc. (Smyth, 2017b) In defence of the West, the frame condemned and 
partly ridiculed the allegations, while avoiding overly emotional tones. (Ibid.) 
Finally, the frame included the element of confrontation between Russia and the West in 
the cultural dimension. The news relevant to this element were potentially attractive to 
wider audiences, as the topics were not as specific to the field of politics and 
international relations. First, the frame addressed Russia’s doping scandal that was 
caused by the World Anti-Doping Agency’s report, which claimed that the Russian 
government assisted with hiding the use of doping by its athletes. (McLaughlin, 2015) 
Although several Russian sources were utilised to describe their position on the matter, 
the frame expressed skepticism towards the views, as the Russian sources argued that 
the report was part of the Western information campaign. Both Russian politicians and 
sports figures labelled the report as a tool of information warfare. (Ibid.) The second 
example touched upon the 2016 Eurovision song contest and the victory of Ukraine 
with a political song, which indirectly addressed the 2014 Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea. Russia contended that Ukraine’s victory was politically motivated and once 
again part of the Western information warfare against Russia. (Martin, 2016) The key 
phrases on Russia’s behalf were “general demonstration” and “politics that beat art”. 
(Ibid.) The frame took a neutral tone on the topic and did not make moral judgements 
on the allegations, apart from skepticism of the Western information warfare, which 
could have been to avoid unnecessary conflicts with the other parties.  
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Technology and extremism frame 
The final frame in the Irish media coverage on information warfare was the technology 
and extremism frame. The frame was constructed through describing the use of 
technology by extremists and means to counter the threats. The main keywords and 
phrases were “radicalise”, “recruit”, “social media”, and “cyber attack”. There were 
three major elements in the frame: tools and platforms employed by extremists, large-
scale cyber attacks by extremists, and means to counter extremism in the cyberspace. As 
reflects from the title of the frame, the discussion was rather technical and focused on 
cyber issues with a direct effect on the societies. Extremism in the frame was principally 
related to Daesh and North Korea (O’Dwyer, 2017a), providing examples of both non-
state and state actors engaging in information warfare. The technology and extremism 
frame was clearly directed at the society and aimed to educate, which was visible in the 
tone and style of writing, particularly in the articles addressing the tools and platforms 
used by extremists as well as means to counter extremism. Therefore, instead of merely 
reflecting on certain events or phenomena, the frame also included and activated the 
audience with the purpose of preventing and countering extremism.  
The first category in the frame introduced the information warfare tools and platforms 
employed by extremists. The discussion focused primarily on the success and practices 
of Daesh. It was described how al-Qaeda’s recruitment and spreading of information 
was based on the tactics of information operations and electronic warfare, while adding 
that Daesh has moved forward to take full advantage of the social media platforms:  
“Isis expanded that [al-Qaeda’s] approach, developing sophisticated tools to 
amplify its propaganda material across social media, from Twitter accounts to 
YouTube videos, going so far as to develop an app called the Dawn of Glad 
Tidings to retweet its messages from the accounts of its followers.” (O’Dwyer, 
2017a) 
In addition to data mining, the frame referred to big data analysis of social media as a 
frequent practice of Daesh, which ensures the efficient distribution of information. 
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Spreading “fake news” on Facebook with shocking headlines to attract more clicks was 
provided as a traditional example of Daesh’s practices, which was considered 
particularly worrisome in combination with Facebook’s algorithms (Ibid; Smyth, 2016). 
The frame also stressed the important role of encrypted communication apps, such as 
WhatsApp and Telegram, which enable secret conversations out of the reach of 
intelligence agencies. (O’Dwyer, 2017a) Finally, the frame utilised a chief architect and 
product director for an IT security company as a source to shed light on the future cyber 
security challenges, not only deriving from Daesh but also other actors. According to 
the source, cyber wars will evolve to affect connected household devices through the 
Internet of Things, which will be the next step from computer terminals. (Slattery, 2017) 
The technology and extremism frame also involved articles on large-scale cyber attacks 
by extremists, which provided examples of the realised risks of information warfare. 
The most extensively covered case were the WannaCry attacks in 2017, which affected 
hundreds of thousands computers in over 100 states. The main characteristics of 
WannaCry were explained in the frame as follows: 
“WannaCry is a form of ransomware, a malware worm that encrypts the 
contents of a hard drive and holds the data hostage, and is demanding payment 
of between $300 and $600 to a Bitcoin account to unlock the 
encryption.” (O’Dwyer, 2017b) 
While the attacks were unanimously condemned, there were also serious moral 
concerns about the fact that the tools used for WannaCry attacks had been stolen from 
the US National Security Agency (NSA) (Ibid.). The US accused North Korea of the 
WannaCry hacks, likewise the 2014 destructive attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment 
(Rosen, Kelley, 2014). Although Ireland was not reportedly harmed by the WannaCry 
attacks, the state’s minister of communication could only consider the state and 
organisations “lucky” (Power, 2017). The judgement presented an appropriate 
acknowledgement of the state’s vulnerability in cyberspace and reinforced the need to 
develop the respective defence capabilities. In the same way, the frame discussed 
attacks on healthcare data and big data, which were recognised as “the greatest security 
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threats in the coming years” (Edwards, 2017b). Moreover, the prospective shift to “non-
traditional avenues of attack” was seen to involve more actors in information warfare 
and damage organisations and individuals who have not invested in cyber security due 
to the lack of previous of exposure (Ibid.). 
The final element of the technology and extremism frame was countering extremism in 
the cyberspace. There were two major normative judgements on countering the threats 
from extremists that led the discussion: first, technology companies have to get more 
involved, and second, democratic states need to intensify cooperation. In regard to the 
latter, the frame utilised a quote by the British prime minister as a call for action: 
“We need to work with allied democratic governments to reach international 
agreements that regulate cyberspace to prevent the spread of extremism and 
terrorism planning.” (O’Dwyer, 2017a) 
For the same purpose, further cooperation was insisted between the technology industry 
and governments. There was a common recognition that cyberspace has become the 
new battlefield, which needs better regulation and to this end, a “digital Geneva 
Convention” was proposed (Edwards, 2017c). The frame emphasised that technology 
alone could not counter extremism, as extremists are highly adaptable to new 
technological solutions, exemplified by the evolution from using social media to also 
include cryptocurrencies, etc (Ullah, 2017). Therefore, it was maintained that 
countering extremism in cyberspace requires a comprehensive and analytical approach 
to data. For example, in the field of terrorist recruitment, it was considered essential to 
focus on separating relevant social media data from the “ineffective layers”, as it is not 
possible nor necessary to counter all extremist communication (Holden, 2015). In 
addition, the frame drew attention to the importance of combining data analysis with 
research on cultural contexts, as the way extremism forms was described to be related to 
the cultural context (Ibid.). Therefore, coming to understand the root causes to one 
turning to extremism would also be key to countering it.  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Comparative analysis 
The previous chapters have analysed the framing of information warfare in Estonian 
and Irish online news media between 2014-2017. The author identified three frames in 
the media coverage of both states: Russia-West confrontation frame, national security 
frame, and truth frame for Estonia, and national security frame, Russia-West 
confrontation frame, and technology and extremism frame for Ireland. This chapter 
aims to provide a comparative analysis of the Estonian and Irish media coverage to 
elaborate on the differences and similarities to gain more comprehensive knowledge of 
the framing of information warfare (see Qualitative framing analysis, p. 26). Therefore, 
the author seeks to answer the following research question: 
Research question 2: What are the main differences and similarities in the 
framing of information warfare in Estonian and Irish online news media in 
2014-2017? 
In order to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question, this chapter will 
compare the following elements relevant to information warfare in Estonian and Irish 
media: coverage and priority given to information warfare, framing of the confrontation 
between Russia and the West, framing of Russia’s interventions in the internal affairs of 
other states, framing of threats to national security, truth versus technology and 
extremism, and the use of rhetorical and technical devices in the media frames. 
Estonian and Irish media gave considerable coverage and priority to information 
warfare, as there were 142 articles published in Estonian media and 74 articles in Irish 
media in the given time frame. Although the number of articles is not central to the 
qualitative analysis, the fact that there were nearly twice as many articles published in 
Estonian media compared to Irish media refers to few salient differences between the 
two states. The main reason for the variation is related to the states’ different 
geopolitical positions and historical backgrounds, which also translated into the content 
of the frames. More specifically, due to the historical background, Estonia is still 
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influenced by Russia’s foreign policy and information warfare as part of it despite 
accessing the EU, NATO, and other Western organisations. Given that Estonia is greatly 
exposed and directly affected by Russia’s information warfare (see Case selection, p 
22), the state cannot afford to refrain from discussions on the respective risks and 
defence matters, both in terms of internal affairs and in the context of international 
defence cooperation. For this reason, countering information warfare is one of the 
priorities on Estonia’s national security agenda and it receives a lot of coverage also in 
media. On the other hand, Ireland as a militarily non-aligned state with a fortunate 
geopolitical position has had limited exposure to information warfare and although the 
state and media acknowledge the respective threats, it is understandable that 
information warfare is not given equal priority in Irish media to that of Estonian media.  
The geopolitical and historical differences described above can be connected with the 
framing of the confrontation between Russia and the West in Estonian and Irish media. 
Although comparing the number of articles included in the frame carries again an 
illustrative purpose, there was a significant difference between Estonia and Ireland in 
this case: in Estonian media, the Russia-West confrontation frame involved 64 articles, 
while for Ireland the respective number was 16. The difference is not only remarkable 
in absolute quantities, but also considering the proportional representation of the frame 
in Estonian and Irish media coverage. Therefore, in order to give meaning to the priority 
of the Russia-West confrontation frame in Estonian media and the moderate to small 
representation in Irish media, it pays to revisit the geopolitical and historical 
differences, which appear to have an influence also on the content of the frames. The 
general tone of the Russia-West confrontation frame in Estonian media was inciting, 
both in terms of reinforcing the opposition as well as calling for unity against Russia. 
The frame emphasised the conflicting principles of the democratic West and the 
authoritarian Russia and insisted on deepened cooperation between the democratic 
states. The characteristics and elements of Russia’s information warfare were also 
thoroughly investigated and condemned as to claim moral superiority over Russia. The 
Irish media coverage took a similar attitude, as it discussed the hostile aims and 
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narratives of Russia’s information warfare, while acknowledging the need for advanced 
cooperation between the Western democracies. However, the Irish media frame did not 
cover the characteristics of Russia’s information warfare in such extent and detail as 
Estonian media, as the topic is less relevant for Ireland. In addition, the Irish media 
frame involved the cultural dimension of the confrontation, which reflects a more 
versatile approach to the topic than that of Estonia, which had the narrow political focus 
on reinforcing the unity of the West. 
Estonian and Irish media coverage also involved the aspect of interventions in the 
internal affairs of other states with a primary focus on elections as part of Russia’s 
information warfare. In Estonian media, Russia’s interventions in elections were 
depicted as an element of the principal confrontation between Russia and the West, 
which were utilised to reinforce the opposition and Russia’s hostility. The interventions 
in the elections of the US, France, Germany, and the Netherlands were included in a set 
of examples, which was then used to illustrate the broader confrontation. As described 
above, Irish media was less concerned with the opposition between Russia and the 
West, which also reflected from the coverage on the interventions. In Irish media, the 
interventions were discussed from the perspective of national security and were thus 
included in the national security frame. The key reason for the variation was the Irish 
media’s approach to the interventions as separate cases rather than a set of elements part 
of the broader opposition as in Estonian media. The Irish media coverage involved more 
extensive descriptions of the interventions and discussed Russia’s information warfare 
case by case without explicitly emphasising the connections between the interventions. 
The variation in the approaches relates back to the geopolitical and historical 
differences, which also inform the states’ national interests. In this case, Estonia’s 
national interest is to reinforce the unity of the West at all levels for defence purposes, 
whereas the issue is not as acute for Ireland and thus the less politically motivated 
approach. 
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The national security of Estonia and Ireland were inseparable elements of the national 
security frames. In Estonian media, the discussion focused on the areas of media and 
psychological security. The threats of information warfare to media were related to the 
information space of the Russian minority, available information channels, and 
integration issues in the Estonian society, while psychological security was discussed in 
connection to psychological defence at the state level, “information hygiene” in the 
society, and information warfare within the society. The frame also utilised instances of 
information warfare from other states as an aligning device or a warning to draw 
attention to the national security issues. In Irish media, the threats of information 
warfare were principally seen as a risk to the state’s democratic process. Legislative 
measures were introduced to counter the threats and deepened defence cooperation at 
the EU level was encouraged to protect the Irish national security. Due to Ireland’s 
limited exposure to information warfare so far, much of the discussion was directed to 
the future and focused on preventive measures to defend Ireland against the attacks as 
experienced by the US, Estonia, and other democratic states. Therefore, the depth of 
discussion in Irish media differed remarkably from that of Estonia, whose extensive 
exposure and experience with information warfare reflect from the debates in media. 
The variations derive again from the states’ different geopolitical positions and 
historical backgrounds, which have a direct effect on the national security challenges. 
One of the most visible differences in the framing of information warfare in Estonian 
and Irish media was the variation in the third frame, which was the truth frame for 
Estonia and the technology and extremism frame for Ireland. In Estonian media, the 
truth frame was primarily concerned with the moral and ethical considerations, which 
were discussed in relation to the opportunities of the democratic states to defend 
themselves against information warfare, the responsibility of media to provide reliable 
information, and information validity in the context of information warfare. In Irish 
media, the technology and extremism frame touched upon the tools and platforms 
employed by extremists, large-scale cyber attacks by extremists, and countering 
extremism in the cyberspace. Although the frames are seemingly different, there were 
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noticeable similarities in the moral judgements represented in Estonian and Irish media, 
which emphasised the importance of the democratic values and the comprehensive 
security of the societies. Both of the frames were also concerned about information 
validity and the impact of the spreading of hostile information on the societies. 
However, the key difference reflected from the discussion on extremism, which was 
neglected in Estonian media in the way it was represented in Irish media, namely 
through the focus on Daesh. The reason could be the perceived distance from the direct 
threats of Daesh in Estonia and the more narrow focus on Russia. Ireland, on the other 
hand, does not have such distance, as the UK has been severely affected by Daesh. 
Therefore, the technical and societal aspects of extremism stand much closer to Ireland 
than to Estonia, which was also visible in the media coverage. 
The final aspect focuses on the rhetorical and technical devices in the Estonian and Irish 
media frames. First, the observed rhetorical devices were keywords, word choice, and 
exemplars. The keywords in the Estonian media were principally related to offences, 
e.g., “war”, “division”, “manipulation”, values, e.g., “ethical”, “freedom of speech”, 
“trust”, and aims, e.g., “integration”, “psychological defence”, “information hygiene”. 
In Irish media, the keywords touched upon offences, e.g., “destabilise”, “intervene”, 
“cyber attack”, information sabotage, e.g., “propaganda”, “fake news”, “manipulation”, 
and extremism, e.g., “radicalise”, “recruit”, “social media”. The parallel category of 
offences reflects the similar understanding of the nature of information warfare, while 
the differences in the other categories refer to more country-specific discussion topics, 
such as extremism in Irish media. In regard to word choice, there was a tendency in the 
frames to use the word “propaganda” as synonym to “information warfare”, which 
applied to the media frames of both countries. Third, as for exemplars, Estonian and 
Irish media emphasised the supremacy of the values and practices of the Western states 
over the offenders conducting information warfare against them. Second, the observed 
technical devices were sources and quotes. It was a common practice in the frames to 
utilise high-level and expert sources to claim validity and reliability, as information 
warfare is a sensitive matter in both regards. The position and expertise of the sources 
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were emphasised before the quote to create an authoritative association. On the other 
hand, quoting the social deviant was more visible in Irish media, particularly in 
describing the cultural dimension of the confrontation between Russia and the West. 
The similar use of the rhetorical and technical devices captures once more the common 
underlying values of Estonia and Ireland that have been reaffirmed in this chapter 
despite the influences of different geopolitical positions and historical backgrounds.  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Limitations 
As a final part of the framing analysis, the author would discuss three main limitations 
of the study. First, the research is unable to explain in which way the media frames 
affect public opinion. Due to the limited scope of the thesis, the study was focused on 
media frames, which enable to analyse how certain issues are presented to the audience 
and presume the potential effect, but the concrete impact cannot be automatically 
assumed (see Media framing, p. 19). Therefore, further research on the topic could 
involve the area of individual frames to explain the effects of the media frames the on 
the audience’s perception. Second, the research was limited in terms of search phrases. 
While the search phrases were the equivalents of information warfare, the research 
could be extended by including other relevant search phrases, for example, the subareas 
of “psychological warfare” and “cyber warfare”. In this case, the scope would again 
exceed the limits of the thesis, but it could provide interesting insight into the topic. The 
third and final limitation to be discussed is related to the number of cases included in 
the research. While the given thesis was a comparative study of two cases, then future 
research could increase the number of cases. For example, an extensive study could 
involve all EU member states to gain knowledge about the perspectives on information 
warfare and thus facilitate mutual understanding and more informed communication 
both at the political and societal levels. However, a large-N study of this kind would 
either require a group of researchers or predefined frames.  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Conclusion 
In recent years, the threats of information warfare have become an inseparable part of 
discussions on security and defence. While states and other actors have employed the 
means of information warfare throughout the history, the threats to states and societies 
have become much more significant in information age. The primary concerns in regard 
to information warfare are related to the threats to people’s minds, described by 
psychological warfare, and threats to the technology and information technology 
infrastructure, which involves physical and virtual infrastructure. The trends are 
worrying in both categories, as the widespread use of computers entails the greater 
exposure to information warfare and people can be affected by various means, may it be 
hacks, fake news, or others of the kind. In regard to hacks, the past few years have 
demonstrated that the attacks can be as serious as to take over hundreds of thousands of 
computers around the world or threaten the democratic processes in some of the most 
influential countries. Similarly, the psychological operations threaten the societies, as 
truth is being blended with half-truths and lies, which makes it difficult to distinguish 
valid and reliable information from the so-called alternative truths. This process is 
further spurred by social media, which is skilfully employed by trolls and terrorist 
groups. These developments illustrate how powerful information can be, if combined 
with refined tactics and devices, which also explains the priority of countering 
information warfare on the international security agenda. 
The thesis has provided an insight into the described developments through analysing 
the framing of information warfare in Estonian and Irish online news media in the past 
four years since 2014 to 2017. The aim of the research was to identify the main media 
frames in the respective countries, elaborate on the elements and framing devices that 
constitute the frames, and produce a comparative analysis of the two cases with the 
purpose to give meaning to the differences and similarities in the perspectives on 
information warfare. In order to conduct the framing analysis, the author collected the 
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articles from the three most visited online media of Estonia and Ireland. Following the 
selection criteria (see, the author found 142 articles from Estonian media in 2014-2017 
that employed the term “infosõda” (i.e., the Estonian equivalent for information warfare 
and information war): 83 articles from Postimees.ee, 17 articles from Delfi.ee, and 42 
articles from Err.ee. In Irish media, the author found in total 74 articles from 2014-2017 
that employed the phrases “information warfare” and “information war”. First, 18 
articles were found that included the phrase “information warfare”: 3 articles from 
Independent.ie, 12 articles from Irishtimes.com, and 3 articles from Thejournal.ie. 
Second, 56 articles were found that included the phrase “information war”: 7 articles 
from Independent.ie, 42 articles from Irishtimes.com, and 7 articles from Thejournal.ie. 
Following the criteria for identifying the frames, the author identified three frames in 
the Estonian media coverage on information warfare: Russia-West confrontation frame, 
national security frame, and truth frame. In Irish media, there were also three frames 
identified: national security frame, Russia-West confrontation frame, and technology 
and extremism frame. 
In the Estonian media coverage on information warfare, the most commonly utilised 
frame was the Russia-West confrontation frame. The frame was constructed through 
describing the authoritarian Russia’s information warfare against the democratic West, 
while emphasising and prioritising the moral superiority of the democracies. Most 
characteristic keywords were “war” and “division”, which were used to reinforce the 
hostile character of Russia’s actions and the aim to amplify any divisions in and 
between the Western states. One of the key examples of the frame was presenting 
Russia’s interventions in the elections of the US, France, Germany, and the Netherlands 
as a set of examples, which portrayed Russia as the offender and reaffirmed the unity of 
the West under the attacks. The second frame was the national security frame. The 
frame discussed information warfare as a threat to national security and inspected the 
challenges at the state level exclusively from the defence perspective. It was constructed 
through three subcategories: threats of information warfare to Estonia’s media, Estonia’s 
psychological security, and the threats of information warfare to the national security of 
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other states. The main keywords were “psychological defence”, and “information 
hygiene”. The primary issue of was the information space of the Russian population in 
Estonia and the frame echoed the opinion that communicating with the Kremlin-
controlled television channel PBK was not justified to reach wider Russian language 
audiences. There was also an interesting example of a call for “information hygiene”, 
which was aimed to warn against engaging in information warfare by sharing 
uncontrolled material on social media. The final frame in the Estonian media coverage 
was the truth frame. The central concerns of the frame were truth and valid information, 
or the lack thereof, in the context of information warfare. Main keywords included 
“ethical” and “freedom of speech”. The frame discussed the ethical challenges of 
democratic states in protecting the social freedoms as well as their sovereignty from 
hostile foreign influence. As the frame endorsed the normative approach to democratic 
freedoms, it provided an example of an organisation that was providing information 
from the outside world to people in North Korea to liberate the population’s awareness. 
In Irish online news media, the most represented frame was the national security frame. 
The frame was constructed through describing information warfare as a threat to the US 
national security, Ireland’s national security, and to the national security of other states. 
The main keywords were “elections” and “intervene”. Above all, the frame was 
concerned with the US presidential elections of 2016. While in other cases, the frame 
identified the external sources of threat, then in the context of the US elections, Russia 
was described as the external threat and Trump’s presidential campaign as the internal 
threat. The second frame was the Russia-West confrontation frame. This frame 
discussed the aims of Russia’s information warfare, Russia’s narratives about the West, 
and the cultural dimension of the Russia-West confrontation. Most characteristic 
keywords were “propaganda” and “destabilise”. Russia was found to successfully 
manipulate with the opinion of domestic audience in claiming that the West was 
“hypocritical”, “multicultural”, and “decadent”. The final frame in Irish media was the 
technology and extremism frame. The frame discussed the use of technology by 
extremists and means to counter the threats, as it described the tools and platforms 
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employed by extremists, large-scale cyber attacks by extremists, and means to counter 
extremism in the cyberspace. The principal keywords used in the frame were 
“radicalise” and “cyber attack”. The two main examples of extremism involved first, the 
success and practices of Daesh with a focus on social media, and second, the large-scale 
cyber attacks in 2017, known as the WannaCry attacks. The frame acknowledged the 
severe threats posed by the skilful use of technology by extremists and called the 
democratic states to cooperate on countering the threats of extremists. 
The comparative analysis of the Estonian and Irish media coverage focused on the 
following range of elements: coverage and priority given to information warfare, 
framing of the confrontation between Russia and the West, framing of Russia’s 
interventions in the internal affairs of other states, framing of threats to national 
security, truth versus technology and extremism, and the use of rhetorical and technical 
devices in the media frames. The author found that the varying coverage of information 
warfare in terms of the number of articles published and the content of the frames 
reflects the different historical and geopolitical background of the states. This aspect 
was also present in other elements of comparison. For example, in Estonian media, the 
Russia-West confrontation frame reinforced the conflict between the democratic West 
and the authoritarian Russia and called the Western states for deepened cooperation, as 
the threats from Russia are perceived more sharply. In Irish media, the Russia-West 
confrontation frame acknowledged the opposition, but the coverage was more diverse in 
terms of content, as it also included a dimension of cultural confrontation. Interestingly, 
Russia’s interventions in the internal affairs of other states were included in different 
frames in Estonian and Irish media: while Estonian media used the interventions as a set 
of examples to reinforce the Russia-West confrontation, then Irish media approached the 
instances from the perspective of national security, as it was politically less motivated. 
In terms of the states’ own national security, Estonian media engaged in heavy  present-
day discussions on the information space of the Russian minority and the psychological 
security of the society, whereas in Irish media, the discussion was more directed to 
preventing the damage of information warfare and legislative measures. In regard to the 
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variation in the third frame, truth versus technology and extremism, the author found 
that the seemingly different frames were connected through emphasising the democratic 
values and the comprehensive security of the societies. As Estonian media prioritised 
discussions on moral considerations and information validity in the context of 
information warfare, it left aside the threats of Daesh, which were well covered in Irish 
media. The author connected this variation with the perceived distance of the threat for 
Estonia, as Ireland is much closer to the threat through the damage Daesh has caused to 
the UK. Finally, the rhetorical and technical devices in the Estonian and Irish media 
frames were compared. The keywords were compared as categories, which in Estonian 
media were described as relating to offences (“manipulation”), values (“freedom of 
speech”), and aims (“integration”), whereas in Irish media, the keywords touched upon 
offences (“intervene”), information sabotage (“propaganda”), and extremism 
(“radicalise”). Further, both Estonian and Irish media often used “propaganda” as a 
synonym to “information warfare” in terms of word choice and viewed Western 
democracies as exemplars as opposed to undemocratic regimes. High-level and expert 
sources were utilised in both countries to claim validity and reliability, while Irish 
media was more likely to also quote the social deviant. In conclusion, the author found 
that despite certain variety in the states’ frames and positions, which derives from the 
different geopolitical and historical background, the comparative analysis has 
reaffirmed the common underlying values and views in regard to information warfare. 
Above all, the framing analysis has highlighted the different nuances in the media 
frames of Estonia and Ireland. While some of the variations can be assumed based on 
the historical background, such as the more politically motivated character of the 
Russia-West confrontation frame in Estonian media compared to Irish media, the study 
was able to reflect upon and compare the main themes in the media coverage of Estonia 
and Ireland. Therefore, the analysis has interpreted what is prioritised in both countries 
in relation to information warfare and further facilitated mutual understanding through 
comparing the differences and similarities. As this kind of analyses support more 
informed communication between states and societies, it would also be beneficial to 
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extend the study to involve more states, for example, all EU member states, as 
interpreting the media frames could point out issues that interstate debates would 
otherwise miss. Given the importance of mutual understanding in terms of the 
comprehensive defence of the EU, the research on media frames deserves further 
investigation.  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